34I0204

This MA course is co-taught with Marcel Weber.

Much of classic empiricist philosophy of science in the 20th century has been skeptical about modal claims, i.e., claims about possible or necessary states of affairs. While laws of nature were always conceived as carrying some kind of necessity, this necessity was traditionally spelled out in epistemic rather than in metaphysical terms. Examples include Goodman's notion of projectability or Hempel's criterion of counterfactual-supporting force. Modal realists such as Lewis, on the other hand, were criticized for being out of touch with scientific practice. In recent decades, modalities have made a comeback in philosophy of science. Some scientific theories and models, on contemporary views, represent possible entities such as supersymmetric particles or possible life forms such as mirror life. Idealized models and thought experiments may reveal objective possibilities and necessities. Counterfactual conditionals such as "if atmospheric greenhouse gases were at pre-industrial levels, the average global temperature would be about 1.4° less" are thought to have a mind-independent truth value, and so on. In this seminar we will discuss some key texts in which we can see this modal turn in philosophy of science unfold.

This seminar will be conducted in English. The readings will be made available on moodle.

Course Requirements

If this seminar is taken for credit, please let us know. For credit in philosophy you will have to fulfill requirements, depending on the module for which you are taking this course.

Contact one of us if you need credit in another programme.

AI policy

In its Statement on artificial intelligence, the University of Geneva clearly states that

In their scientific publications and creations, researchers and students are required to respect the rules and principles governing scientific integrity, in particular the prohibition of plagiarism, and to comply with good scientific practice.

This good scientific practice demands that the use of generative AI "must always be explicitly agreed upon with the research supervisor and must be methodologically describable" (Guidebook on Generative Artificial Intelligence, p. 14) because they "raise issues of plagiarism" (ibid.). Hence, "[w]riting tasks should not be delegated to the tool" (ibid.). In other words, it is impermissible to use ChatGPT or similar tools in the writing of seminar papers or theses.

Course Materials

All reading materials will be made available on Moodle.

Course materials such as lecture notes, handouts, etc may be made available as they will be used in class.

Schedule (Fall 2026)

This is the schedule for the seminar. It is subject to adjustment.

Date Readings Presenter(s)
16.09. No seminar (workshop)
23.09. Introduction: Williamson (2017) Marcel Weber, Christian Wüthrich
30.09. van Fraassen (1989)
07.10. Lewis (1987)
14.10. Woodward (2004)
21.10. Giere (1988)
28.10. Frigg and Nguyen (2016)
04.11. No seminar (semaine de lecture)
11.11. Roussos (2025)
18.11. Baron, Le Bihan, and Read (2026)
(taught by Baptiste Le Bihan)
25.11. Dennett (1995)
02.12. Koskinen (2017)
09.12. Ruyant (2020)
16.12. Ismael (2017)