

1. What is an impredicative definition? Why might one think that impredicative definitions are problematic? [1 point]
2. How does Russell define natural numbers? How does he define rational numbers? How does this force him to assume an axiom of 'infinity'? [2 points]
3. What is the declared goal of logicism? To what extent did it succeed in this ambition? To what extent did it fail? [3 points]
4. A term formalist identifies mathematical entities with their names. What is Frege's main objection to term formalism? Does the objection succeed? What could a term formalist say in response to Frege? [2 points]
5. How do Gödel's incompleteness theorems affect Hilbert's program? As a reminder, here are informal statements of Gödel's two theorems (no need to repeat them in your answer):

Theorem 1 (Gödel's first incompleteness theorem). *Let T be a formal system. If T contains some arithmetic, and it can be determined algorithmically whether a given sequence of characters is a well-formed formula and a valid deduction in T , then "there is a sentence G in the language of T such that*

(a) *if T is consistent, then G is not a theorem of T , and*

(b) *if T has a property a bit stronger than consistency... then the negation of G is not a theorem of T ."* (Shapiro, 166)

Theorem 2 (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem). *"[I]f the formalization of 'provable in T ' meets some straightforward requirements, then we can derive, in T , a sentence that expresses the following:*

If T is consistent, then G is not derivable in T .

But, as noted above, 'G is not derivable in T' is equivalent to G. So, we can derive, in T, a sentence to the effect that

If T is consistent then G.

Assume that T is consistent, and that we can derive, in T, the requisite statement that T is consistent; then it would follow that we can derive G in T. This contradicts the [first] incompleteness theorem. So if T is consistent, then one cannot derive in T the requisite statement that T is consistent." (166f)

[2 points]